In April 2025, Tanzania’s judiciary delivered a ruling that sent shockwaves through the country’s political landscape. The main opposition party, CHADEMA, would not be allowed to participate in the upcoming general election. The official reason was a procedural failure to sign a code of conduct. But the real consequence is far more serious. Tanzania is now heading into a national election in October 2025 without its most prominent opposition voice on the ballot. What does an election mean when the outcome is no longer competitive? Can democracy survive when competition is removed before the first vote is cast?
This development has raised sharp questions not only about the credibility of the upcoming election but about the overall direction of Tanzania’s political system. For a country that had shown a sign of democratic renewal just a few years ago, the exclusion of CHADEMA marks a troubling reversal. When President Samia Suluhu Hassan assumed office in 2021, her leadership was met with cautious optimism. After a period of political repression, she appeared to offer a reset. Bans on media outlets were lifted. Opposition leaders were released. In January 2023, political rallies that were previously banned were allowed to resume. There was hope that Tanzania was returning to a more open and inclusive political tradition.
However, the 2025 electoral climate tells a different story. The disqualification of CHADEMA, the arrest of its presidential candidate Tundu Lissu, and the wider crackdown on dissent suggest a shift away from political openness. What began as a reformist tenure now risks being remembered as the moment when democracy was managed rather than revitalized.
This commentary discusses interlinked dynamics shaping Tanzania’s democratic trajectory as the country heads towards 2025 elections and offers recommendations that ensure free and fair elections.
Key Issues
This section addresses interlinked dynamics shaping Tanzania’s democratic trajectory as the country heads towards 2025 elections, key among them; how legal mechanisms are used to eliminate competition through manipulation, how political alternatives are weakened, how youth are driven into silence, and how these developments align with broader regional trends of democratic decline.
- Institutional Manipulation
The exclusion of CHADEMA from the 2025 race, justified by a failure to sign a code of conduct, illustrates how legal procedures are being used to reshape political competition. While appearing procedural, the judiciary’s decision effectively removed Tanzania’s main opposition from the ballot, reinforcing concerns about institutional neutrality. Tanzania’s Political Parties Act and Election Act grants wide discretion to electoral authorities, allowing legal tools to be used in ways that undermine political pluralism (Legal and Human Rights Centre, 2023). This tactic reflects a growing regional pattern. In Uganda and Ethiopia, opposition actors have been blocked from participating in campaigns through public order laws or excluded entirely from the ballot under legal pretexts (Freedom House, 2024). Such practices align with what scholars term “competitive authoritarianism” — systems that preserve the appearance of democracy while strategically weakening opposition through institutional means (Levitsky & Way, 2010). The result is not open contestation, but managed democracy, where legality serves to entrench incumbency rather than protect fairness. - Erosion of Political Alternatives
With CHADEMA excluded, Tanzania’s 2025 election risks becoming an exercise in legitimacy rather than a genuine contest. The ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has governed without interruption since 1977. In the absence of a viable challenger, the election may proceed procedurally but not democratically. The 2020 general elections already signaled a decline in competitiveness, with voter turnout falling to 50.72%, down from 67.34% in 2015 (National Electoral Commission of Tanzania, 2021). This decline reflects growing public skepticism about the value of elections as a means of accountability. Without credible opposition, citizens view elections as symbolic. Political engagement becomes ritualistic, not substantive. Governance becomes insulated from public pressure, and citizens lose faith in the democratic process. The erosion of alternatives means the electorate is left with form, not choice. - Youth Alienation in a Shrinking Digital Space
Tanzania’s youth, defined as individuals between the ages of 15 and 35, constitute approximately 34.5% of the population (Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics, 2024). For many, traditional political spaces are distant. In the last decade, digital platforms became critical for civic engagement, protest organisation, and policy advocacy. Yet the state’s response has been increasingly repressive. The Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations (2020) and amendments to the Cybercrimes Act have imposed licensing requirements, surveillance, and punitive fines on digital content creators and dissenters. The government has also issued warnings against VPN usage, enforced telecom blocks during protests, and broadened the definition of “false information” to include criticism of the state (ARTICLE 19, 2024). These developments coincide with a rise in forced disappearances and abductions of youth activists, with civil society documenting at least 17 politically motivated disappearances between 2022 and 2024 (Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition, 2024). Youths are increasingly convinced that speaking out is unsafe, and that participation does not yield results. Survey data from Afrobarometer (2023) indicate that only 29% of Tanzanian youth believe elections reflect the will of the people, a 14-point drop since 2018. This data underscores the deepening sense of disillusionment. If democracy does not work for the youth, what future does it hold for the nation? - A Regional Pattern of Managed Democracy
Though Tanzania’s context is unique, it mirrors developments in the region. In Uganda, opposition leader Bobi Wine has faced repeated arrests, blocked rallies, and digital surveillance. Rwanda’s opposition is largely symbolic, restrained by legislation that limits party registration and activity. These cases reflect a shared regional trend where the façade of democracy is preserved while genuine contestation is eliminated. Tanzania’s exclusion of CHADEMA reinforces this trend. Electoral procedures remain, but competition is tightly managed. Courts and commissions, meant to safeguard democracy, are often instrumentalized to neutralize dissent. The result is not the absence of democracy but its quiet hollowing out.
Conclusion
Tanzania’s 2025 election is emerging not as a celebration of democratic choice but as a carefully orchestrated performance of continuity. The exclusion of CHADEMA, the enduring dominance of Chama Cha Mapinduzi, the shrinking civic and digital space, and the youth’s political withdrawal all point to a democracy that retains form but lacks substance.
This commentary has traced how legal mechanisms are used to eliminate competition, how political alternatives are weakened, how youth are driven into silence, and how these developments align with broader regional trends of democratic decline.
What is unfolding in Tanzania is more than a national crisis. It is a regional warning. The future of democracy depends not only on whether elections are held but on whether they are genuinely competitive, inclusive, and accountable. Anything less risks entrenching a new kind of authoritarianism disguised in constitutionalism and legal correctness.
Policy Recommendations
- Constrain Legal Discretion in Electoral Governance
Amend the Political Parties Act and the Election Act to limit the discretionary powers of the Registrar of Political Parties and the National Electoral Commission. Introduce mandatory judicial oversight for party disqualifications to prevent procedural manipulation and safeguard political pluralism. - Restore Political Pluralism and Opposition Engagement
Convene an inclusive national dialogue involving the government, opposition parties, and civil society to review laws governing party registration and electoral fairness. Outcomes from this process should inform reforms to be enacted ahead of the 2030 electoral cycle to reinstate credibility and competition in elections. - Enhance Youth Participation and Digital Rights
Repeal restrictive online content laws and safeguard digital freedoms to create safe spaces for civic engagement. Reintroduce civic education in schools and support youth-led political dialogue through community-based programs. Simplify NGO registration processes to allow youth organizations to operate freely. - Introduce a Regional Democracy and Rule of Law Scorecard
The East African Community, in collaboration with the African Peer Review Mechanism, should develop a regional democracy index tracking electoral integrity, press freedom, and judicial independence. Member states exhibiting consistent democratic backsliding should face peer review and appropriate diplomatic measures.
References
- Associated Press. (2025, April 12). Tanzania’s main opposition party faces election ban after leader is charged with treason. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/e1d444f5ac2a5e9ff5fee59547b05c66
- Cheeseman, N., & Klaas, B. (2018). How to rig an election. Yale University Press.
- Freedom House. (2025). Freedom in the World 2025: Tanzania Country Report. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/country/tanzania/freedom-world/2025
- Human Rights Watch. (2025, April 15). Tanzanian Opposition Leader’s Arrest Spells Trouble for Elections. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/04/15/tanzanian-opposition-leaders-arrest-spells-trouble-elections
- Legal and Human Rights Centre. (2023). Tanzania Human Rights Report 2022/2023. Retrieved from https://www.humanrights.or.tz/reports
- Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010). Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge University Press.
- National Bureau of Statistics (Tanzania). (2024). 2022 Population and Housing Census – Youth Statistical Abstract. Retrieved from https://www.nbs.go.tz
- National Electoral Commission of Tanzania. (2021). General Election Report 2020. Retrieved from https://www.nec.go.tz
- Afrobarometer. (2023). Dispatch No. 604: Tanzanians express declining confidence in elections. Retrieved from https://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/ad604-tanzania-elections/
- ARTICLE 19 Eastern Africa. (2024). Tanzania: Internet Freedom Report. Retrieved from https://www.article19.org/region/eastern-africa
- Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition. (2024). Annual Report on Threats Against Activists. Retrieved from https://www.thrdc.or.tz/reports
- Reuters. (2025, April 11). Tanzania opposition leader Lissu faces new challenge with treason charge. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/uncompromising-tanzania-opposition-leader-lissu-faces-new-challenge-with-treason-2025-04-11/
- The Chanzo. (2025, April 11). Tundu Lissu Wanted Reforms. The Govt Gave Him Treason Charges. Retrieved from https://thechanzo.com/2025/04/11/tanzanias-opposition-leader-tundu-lissu-wanted-reforms-the-govt-gave-him-treason-charges/
- The Citizen. (2025, April 17). Lawyers split over Chadema disqualification controversy. Retrieved from https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/lawyers-split-over-chadema-disqualification-controversy-5006672
- The East African. (2025, March). Parties dig in for proper political reforms ahead of October elections. Retrieved from https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/parties-dig-in-for-proper-political-reforms-ahead-of-elections-4965860