From June 18, 2024, Kenya has witnessed a wave of protests by the youth, especially those popularly referred to as the Gen Z (the cohort born between 1997 and 2013). On that day, the youth, who appeared to be well organized, staged peaceful protests across the country, especially in Nairobi, Mombasa, and Eldoret. In a movement dubbed “Occupy Parliament”, the youth in their thousands attempted to enter the National Assembly but were prevented from doing so by security personnel. Their aim was to pressurize members of the National Assembly to reject the bill in its entirety. Earlier they had used social media platforms and phone calls to urge the MPs to vote for “rejection.” In the June 18th vote, supporters of the bill emerged victorious, setting the stage for the last phase that was concluded with a similar result on 25th June 2024. This led to an outrage from the protestors who gained access to parliament, setting a section of the buildings on fire. Several protestors were injured, some fatally. The aim of this commentary is to unpack the real issues behind the protests with the understanding that the 2024 Finance bill was merely the “spark” or “trigger” of a bomb that had been waiting to explode.
It is important to understand the profile of Gen Z who have instigated and led the protests. According to official statistics, the Gen Z cohort form the bulk of Kenya’s population (Economic Survey, 2024). Indeed the 2019 census showed that 75 percent of the population or 35.7 million was below the age of 35 years. This generation exhibits characteristics that are remarkably different from the generations before it. It is “tribeless,” that is, they do not care about their ethnicities. There are more inter-ethnic marriages among them more than among preceding generations. It is instructive that their protests are largely de-ethnicized, making it difficult to divide their movement on ethnic lines. Political elites who have always used ethnicity to break up anti-regime movements have so far failed to penetrate them.
They are also remarkably technology savvy. The Gen Z cohorts have matured in the age of Information Communication Technology (ICT) and are the drivers of the growing digital economy. Indeed, ICT curricula were introduced in learning institutions, especially in universities and tertiary colleges during their school days. They have used their ICT knowledge to effectively organize their protests during which they have been ahead of law enforcement authorities. Gen Z is also very confident, intelligent and fiercely independent minded, having grown in an era of democratic growth with the emphasis on human rights and freedom. They witnessed their older parents, siblings and mentors fight to expand the democratic space and for constitutional changes. Most importantly they matured in the post-2010 constitution era of “haki yetu!” (our rights). They have the courage to “stand up for their rights.” It should also be noted that Gen Z is represented in virtually all critical sectors of the economy and society. Thus, young doctors and lawyers, for instance, volunteered their services during the protests. There appears to be remarkable solidarity among the cadre.
This cadre of youth, though defined by their age, can be differentiated into several categories. First, we have those in formal and informal employment, with the majority belonging to the latter. They are arguably beneficiaries of the Kibaki-era reforms in the education sector, including compulsory and free primary education and expansion of access to education for children from virtually all sections of society. Many of them also got the opportunity to join universities whose number also increased exponentially from only about 20 to 70 today. A majority of them have been employed in both the public and private sectors. This group is directly affected by the fiscal and tax policies of the current regime, including the 2023 Finance Act and the hitherto proposed 2024 Finance bill. Many of them could also not get jobs in the formal sector and started their own “hustles.” These “hustlers” are believed to have overwhelmingly voted for the current regime, based on the latter’s hustler-based campaigns. It is instructive that businesses started by this group had suffered from the devastating effects of Covid-19 in 2020-2022. They, therefore, would loathe government policy that they would perceive to interfere with the post-Covid recovery of their “hustles”.
Another category of the Gen Z cohort that has been participating in the protests are university students. In the 1970s through early 1990s, university students were part of anti-status quo protests. In the 1980s, for instance, university of Nairobi was the epicenter of anti-regime protests during the struggle for the second liberation. Today, the number of universities has increased from only one in the 1970s and early 1980s to 70 with virtually each county hosting at least one. Presence of university students has boosted attendance and given more impetus to protests in counties outside Nairobi. University students have several grievances that have fueled their anger against the regime. They havecomplained about increases in fees, poor learning environment, and long delays in disbursement of loans by the Higher Education Loans Board. They have also argued that the tax burden is undermining their parents’ and guardians’ ability to support their university education.
Yet another special category of the Gen Z generation that has played a critical role in the protests are the social media “brigade.” This group includes content creators, social media influencers, TikTokers and other ICT experts. Through WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, X, and other social media platforms, they have contributed to the organization, mobilization and coordination of the protests. This group also has some criticism with the tax and other policies introduced in 2023 and those proposed in the 2024 Finance Bill, which they claim are punitive and might undermine their income generation activities.
Apart from grievances specific to various sections of the youth, and as hinted above, there are some underlying factors to which the protests could be attributed. One of these is the youth bulge. According to the 2019 national census, the youth constitute almost 75% of Kenya’s population (Economic Survey, 2024). The economy, however, has not created enough jobs and opportunities for the growing population of the youth. Rising levels of poverty and inequalities in the country may have also contributed to the protests. The educated but unemployed youth are increasingly becoming disillusioned and desperate in a country where there is stiff cut-throat competition. They are not likely to accept explanations that they had to pay more taxes in order to raise revenue to salvage a collapsing economy while there are reports of rampant corruption and misuse of public resources by leaders. They wonder why they should be asked to sacrifice in order to “fund” sleaze and extravagance among the political elite.
Whereas President Ruto on Wednesday, 26th June, 2024 yielded to pressure from the protestors not to sign the 2024 Finance Bill into an Act to make it operational, the youth have insisted that the President’s concession is too little too late. They also claim they do not trust the Presidency to honor the promise to totally do away with the bill. They continued with demonstrations on 27th June, 2024 but were prevented from marching to State House. The situation is, however, expected to gradually come under control, especially after the President made concessions, including an offer for talks, and deployment of more security personnel to the streets. What is certain, however, is that the problem will not go away soon. The youth shall continue to agitate for their grievances to be addressed.
In order to tackle the youth problem, a number of measures should be taken in the short and long term. In order to cultivate and win the trust of the protestors, the government should ensure the immediate implementation of austerity measures announced on 26th June 2024. Specific measures should be taken to cut down wastage by both the national and county governments. Several measures have been announced in the past but have not been fully implemented. The Head of Public Service should now demand immediate implementation. To instill some measure of hope and optimism among students in universities and other tertiary institutions, relevant government agencies should ensure student loans and bursaries are disbursed immediately in time. Programs similar to the defunct “Kazi Mtaani” that employed several youths on casual terms should be established and funded by savings from budget cuts from non-priority projects. Public and state officers should refrain from conspicuous displays of wealth. The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), Courts and the Director of Public Prosecution should expedite the prosecution of corruption suspects. A special quasi-governmental agency should be established to handle youth affairs. Government should guarantee loans from commercial banks for youth to start business enterprises. Retirement age requirements for public servants should be strictly enforced to free jobs for the youth.