Photo credit: Al Jazeera
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) continues to grapple with instability and violence especially in the Eastern region. The presence of numerous armed groups threatens regional integration and security. This is despite various multilateral and regional interventions such as those from the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), and the recently deployed Southern African Development Community Mission in DRC (SAMIDRC). This commentary examines the significant challenges that EACRF encountered in its deployment and highlights essential lessons for SAMIDRC and future peacekeeping efforts in the troubled region.
In November 2022, the EACRF was deployed in the Eastern DRC to restore peace and stability. The regional force comprised troops from Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and South Sudan. It achieved varying levels of success in fulfilling its mandate. For instance, it implemented ceasefires, established and maintained buffer zones, facilitated partial opening of borders such as the Bunagana-Rutshuru border enabling free movement of goods, services, and people, and provided essential humanitarian aid. In spite of these accomplishments, the EACRF encountered several obstacles that hindered its intended objectives. As a consequence, the host government denied the renewal of its mandate, leading to its replacement by SAMIDRC in December 2023.
First, political interference and the lack of political goodwill from the host government acted as an obstruction to the EACRF’s mandate. On several accounts, President Félix Tshisekedi and members of his government publicly criticized the EACRF, particularly in its response towards the March 23 Movement (M23) rebels. These criticisms, seen as political rhetoric aimed at gaining support from voters, eroded trust in the EACRF amongst civilians, leading to negative public perception and widespread protests against the force, notably in Goma.
Second, coordination challenges and competing interests arising from multiple deployments under multilateral and bilateral arrangements in DRC negatively impacted on the forces’ mandate. For instance, Uganda had deployed troops as part of the EACRF while simultaneously engaging in a joint operation with the DRC to counter the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel group. Similarly, Burundi had troops under a bilateral agreement tasked with combating the M23. Kenya also had a contingent operating under MONUSCO. Resultantly, the absence of effective coordination mechanisms impeded effective cooperation between these forces.
Third, EACRF’s limited mandate undermined its credibility and effectiveness in addressing instability in the region. It had a mandate that included conducting operations with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) in the Joint Operations Area (JOA), geared towards defeating the armed groups’ elements in the Eastern DRC, and the maintenance of law and order.[1]
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The EACRF consistently asserted its lack of an offensive mandate, emphasizing that the use of force against armed groups was only considered as a last resort. The latter in part speaks to the fluidity of such peace support operations that in many instances operate as a hybrid between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Due to concerns over perceived passivity in handling armed groups, the government, local population and the civil societies mounted pressure on EACRF. Consequently, Kinshasa pursued an alternative regional force equipped with offensive capabilities, leveraging its membership in Southern African Development Community (SADC) to facilitate the deployment of SAMIDRC.
Fourth, EACRF suffered from inadequate funding, and logistical support. This limited its ability to respond to the dynamic security challenges in the Eastern DRC. Predominantly, it received its funding from troop contributing countries. Each country was responsible for financing its own contingent within the EACRF. Limited financial support from external partners further exacerbated sustainability and funding issues. The EAC Secretary General estimated that almost $ 4 million was being spent on troops monthly[2].
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Fifth, the presence of numerous armed groups in Eastern DRC posed significant challenges to EACRF peacekeeping efforts. With over 120 armed groups operating in the region, some of which receive support from regional and multilateral actors benefiting from the DRC’s natural resources, the complexity of the situation hampered peacekeeping efforts. For example, DRC has accused Rwanda of backing the M23 rebel group, while the DRC government itself has faced criticism for allegedly using armed groups like the Mai-Mai to target the M23. Such tactics raise concerns about the government’s role in perpetuating violence and instability, potentially undermining efforts to achieve lasting peace.
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To ensure the success of the newly deployed SAMIDRC in fostering peace in Eastern DRC, it must adapt its approach accordingly and address the obstacles encountered by its predecessor, the EACRF. Central to this endeavour, is the imperative to uphold neutrality and independence, both from external influences and internal factions. By maintaining impartiality, the mission can prioritize its mandated objectives without succumbing to political pressures or internal discord, thereby safeguarding its credibility and enhancing its effectiveness in peacekeeping efforts.
Similarly, SAMIDRC must prioritize seamless coordination and collaboration among troop contributing countries and various peacekeeping missions operating in the DRC. By fostering unity of command and facilitating joint operations, the force can enhance its effectiveness on the ground. Such concerted efforts not only prevent duplication of efforts but also optimize resources, ultimately bolstering the overall success of the mission which is to restore peace and stability in the eastern DRC.[3]
Additionally, the force should adopt a clear and well-defined mandate, supported by a coherent strategy, as this is critical to the success of peacekeeping operations. Clarifying the force mandate will help to align its objectives with public expectations and ensure transparent communication. This should encompass encouraging regional actors to prioritize political dialogue and reconciliation as pathways to sustainable peace.
SADC and SAMIDRC troop contributing countries should invest in resources and capacity building. Funding, equipment, and training, are essential for the success of peacekeeping operations. Collaborating with regional and international stakeholders such as the African Union and United Nations to secure funding is paramount. By engaging with these entities, SADC can effectively mobilize the necessary resources to bolster its peacekeeping operations. The tapping of the AU Peace Fund would actualize the evolving actualization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
SAMIDRC should also adopt a holistic approach that combines security, political, and development interventions to address the root causes of the problem. It should work closely with local communities, international organizations, and other stakeholders to address the underlying drivers of instability in the Eastern DRC. This will help in not only addressing the M23 rebel group, but also the other armed groups in the region.
In conclusion, the involvement of foreign troops in the DRC presents both opportunities and challenges in the quest for peace and stability. By learning from these challenges, SAMIDRC can enhance its effectiveness and contribute to lasting peace and stability in the Eastern DRC.