Abstract
This working paper appraises Kenya’s counter-terrorism policies in the post- Operation Linda Nchi period (2011) to identify successes and gaps in its evolving architecture. Key areas of success include the introduction of the multi-agency approach, requisite legislation, and the reduction of the impact of terrorism incidences. The paper observes that emerging gaps in the counter-terrorism space exist at the local, regional, and global levels. These include the lack of an overarching counter-terrorism strategy, gaps in countering terrorism financing, insufficient multi-agency cooperation, and insufficient buy-in from communities owing to lackluster community engagement preventative strategy. The paper recommends among others the development of an overarching counter-terrorism strategy while accounting for regional and global dynamics that have an implication on Kenya’s counter-terrorism responses.
Introduction
This study appraises Kenya’s counter-terrorism policies, focusing on the period between 2012- 2024. This appraisal is conducted in light of Kenya’s evolving counter-terrorism security architecture in this period. The paper is guided by several questions. The overarching question for the paper is whether Kenya’s counter-terrorism security architecture is fit for purpose.
In this paper, terrorism while contested in the extant literature, is applied to include political violence or the use of violence to realize political goals. This violence can be used to target civilians and non-civilians. Furthermore, terrorist acts are considered strategic forms of communication to demonstrate an actor’s capability and resolve (Muibu & Cubukcu, 2023).
Counter-terrorism is applied to mean the use of hard power initiatives such as the use of force, and legal frameworks to address the threats of terrorism (Mogire & Mkutu, 2011). Countering terrorism in Kenya needs to be reflective of the dynamics of the region including a mix of poverty, economic underdevelopment, radical Islamist networks, and cells of international terror networks (Kagwanja, 2006).
Kenya’s counter-terrorism architecture has been evolving robustly since 2011 when Kenya intervened in Somalia and its subsequent transition to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as security threats from terrorism intensified. Kenya’s vulnerability to terrorism has in part been linked to an unstable region but also internal governance gaps. While terrorism incidences remained low scale in the 1980s and 1990s, the 1998 US embassy bombing was one of the significant attacks that catapulted strategic policy responses to counter- terrorism. The 2000s to late 2011, were marked by low-scale terror attacks. The threats of terrorism however became more imminent in the late 2000s and necessitated a military intervention to counter Al-Shabaab (AS) threats. Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) was launched to counter the AS threat by the Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia and later rehatted to join AMISOM) in 2012. A series of AS attacks at the time negatively impacted Kenya’s tourism sectors and various strategic infrastructure projects such as the then-nascent LAPPSET project. Operation Linda Nchi was focused on creating a buffer zone in Southern Somalia’s region of Jubaland (Githigaro, 2023). Al- Shabaab in retaliation for the intervention threatened repercussions for this operation. The group then launched a series of low-scale and high-profile attacks post-2011. Most of these attacks have been concentrated in the northeastern, coastal, and Nairobi regions (Muibu & Cubukcu, 2023).
In 2012, after almost a decade of effort, Kenya enacted a new law the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). AS attacks at Westgate and Garissa University in 2013 and 2015 respectively further had an impact on Kenya’s counter-terrorism architecture. This working paper examines the successes and gaps of counter- terrorism policies.
Study Questions
The general study question for this paper is whether Kenya’s counter-terrorism policies are fit for purpose (2012-2024). Sub-study questions include:
- What successes have been achieved in counter-terrorism in the study period?
- What are some of the emerging gaps in counter-terrorism?
- How should counter-terrorism policies be enhanced in light of changing regional and global dynamics?
Methodology Note
This study adopted a qualitative research approach. It relied on both primary and secondary data. In terms of primary data, it draws on 11 key informant interviews conducted between March and April 2024. The participants included academic and policy practitioners in the security sector. These interviews were purposively selected based on their expertise in the subject. The interviews were complemented by secondary data from books, journals, grey literature, and newspaper reports. The qualitative data collected was analyzed thematically.
Theoretical framework
This paper works within the realm of securitization theory as proposed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and others within the Copenhagen School. The core claim of the theory- which is socio-constructivist is that security is to be interpreted as a ‘speech act’ that allows threats to be represented and recognized. Objects or actors that are threatened can be termed as ‘referent objects’ and require securing. The act of securitization is therefore a deed of framing an issue as an existential threat that requires extraordinary measures beyond the confines of everyday politics. This then allows the presentation of an issue as a security threat that requires a high prioritization and therefore necessitates extra-ordinary measures (Williams, 2003).
The Copenhagen School argues that security includes several sectors each with a referent object and a threat agenda. These would include the ‘military sector’ where the referent object is territorial integrity where threats are defined externally. The political sector is where the legitimacy of the government is at stake with threats that are ideological or sub-state. The other sector that departs from military-territorial focus with an emphasis on ‘societal’ security where the identity of a group is threatened.
This theory is applied in this study to understand how political administrations in the study period have framed the threats of terrorism and the extraordinary interventions they have proposed (Williams, 2003).
Background
Appraising Kenya’s counter-terrorism policies also needs to be reflective of regional and global security landscapes. Within the region, a fragile Somalia, internal state vulnerabilities, an adaptable Al-Shabaab, and inroads by the Islamic State (IS)have all contributed to the threat landscape. Before the rise of the Al- Shabaab post 2006, Al-Qaeda had made several inroads in Kenya since the 1990s resulting in the 1998 terror bombing in Nairobi. The 1998 bombing had the effect of elevating terrorism to national security considerations. In the post-September 11 (9/11) period, Kenya was designated as a frontline state by the United States (US) in the then-evolving Global War on Terror. The Kenyan government has therefore over time continued to securitize the threats of terrorism largely from a weak state in Somalia, the reach of AS in the region, and a growing home grown extremism in such places as Lamu. (Hansen, 2016; Omeje & Githigaro, 2012).
Several personalities are deemed to have been critical to the creation of an early radical Islamist environment in Kenya. They included Sheikh Abdulaziz Rimo, and Sheikh Aboud Rogo Mohamed who were claimed by the Kenyan government to have been a critical cog in the Al-Shabaab recruitment process in Kenya (Boga et al 2021). Another key ideologue was Sheikh Samir Hussein, a Kenyan of Indian descent. His speeches that were available on the internet were centered on a global jihad with this theme setting the stage for the future rhetoric of the Kenyan Al-Shabaab. He emphasized anti-Americanism and the discourses that the Muslim community was under threat globally (Hansen 2016).
Progressively Al-Shabaab managed to develop contacts with Kenyan organizations including the Kenya Muslim Youth Centre then based in Majengo, Nairobi, and among its leaders included a former student of Rogo, Ahmed Iman Ali. The Centre initially established to support youth empowerment later became an important link for Al-Shabaab recruitment. Indeed, when Ahmed Ali left for Somalia in 2009, he established a Kenyan contingent in Al-Shabaab estimated at between 200- 500 fighters in 2011. The Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee (PRMC) where Ali had been a member was linked by a UN Monitoring Group to have been a regular supplier of funds to the Muslim Youth Centre which then supported Al-Shabaab in Kenya. In February 2012, the Muslim Youth Center blog declared that it had joined the Al-Shabaab The early recruits to Al-Shabaab in Kenya were from a variety of backgrounds. Some of these were recent converts to Islam, petty criminals, and individuals influenced by radical Islamists (Hansen, 2016). Al- Shabaab enhanced its propaganda with an online magazine that emerged in 2012, Gaidi Mtaani, and a YouTube account’ Themzelles’. Several editions of the Magazine referenced Kenyan examples of Muslim oppression including that the Al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia was a response to the onslaught on the West and in particular US and Israel on Islam (Hansen, 2016). Consequently, Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia in 2011 was framed by Ahmed Iman Ali in a speech as part of this larger struggle for which Islam had to engage for its existence. Similar references were made in other contexts such as Palestine, the Philippines, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Iraq. He declared in the end that a jihad was to be waged in Kenya as part of its propaganda efforts (Hansen 2016).
Within the region, other Al-Shabaab networks have expanded in Tanzania and Uganda. Tanzania built a network around the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC). It sent young students to study with Rogo in Kenya. By 2011, it was estimated that seventy-five Tanzanians were fighting in Somalia. Similarly, a network developed in Uganda with Kenyan and Tanzanian Al-Shabaab supporters culminated with the 2010 terror attacks in Kampala (Hansen, 2016).
In the period of analysis, threats of terrorism intensified with the Westgate attack in September 2013 claiming 67 lives, the 2015 Garissa University College claimed at least 148 lives, and the Dusit D2 in Nairobi in January 2019 claiming 21 lives (Kamau, 2021). In response to these evolving threats, a series of legal and institutional frameworks have been put in place. The legal frameworks included the 2010 Prevention of Organized Crime Act (POCA), the 2009 Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (POCAMLA), the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), and the 2014 Security Laws (Amendment) Act (SLAA). In 2016, there was the launch of the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism later cascaded with the development of County Action Plans (CAPs) to address the threats of violent extremism (Kamau, 2021).
Security commentators and analysts contend that AS has been focused on Kenya for several reasons. One is Kenya’s involvement in counter-terrorism and in particular Kenya’s Defence Forces intervention in Somalia in late 2011. AS frames this intervention as an occupation that creates grounds for radicalization and launching attacks. Second, AS has been able to exploit a range of real or perceived grievances in Kenya’s history such as the marginalization of certain communities, youth unemployment, and ethnic/religious profiling in counter-terrorism. These grievances have in turn been used as baits for radicalization and recruitment (Kamau, 2021). The government’s aggressive approach for example has targeted the Somali community with increased surveillance, and varied human rights abuses linked to security agencies (Muibu & Cubukcu, 2023). These stances have to do with a history of government securitization of communities and regions beginning in the 1960S with threats of irredentism in the northeastern province and the aftermath of the 1998 bombings. The increased securitization has also targeted Somali refugees living in urban spaces including concerns about the legitimacy of their identification documents (Malibu & Cubukcu, 2023; Balakian, 2016). The next section of the paper discusses the findings starting with the successes that have been achieved in the counter-terrorism front.
Discussion of findings
This section appraises the successes that have been achieved on the counter- terrorism front.
Legislative frameworks
One of the notable successes in the counter-terrorism domain in the study period has been the progressive development of legislation to prevent and counter the threats of terrorism. One of the early gaps that needed to be closed therefore was the development of legal frameworks and policies to guide prevention efforts but also to prosecute terrorism cases. There exist several pieces of legislation in this regard. These include the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) which provides guidelines on the investigation and prosecution of terrorism suspects. Before the passing of POTA, there was an overreliance on the penal code which had gaps, particularly in dealing with the organized nature of terrorism. In December of 2014 and reflective of the Westgate attack in 2013, parliament passed the Security Laws Amendment Act (SLAA) which sought to strengthen several laws including POTA. SLAA was critical in defining the role of the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) as a coordinator of counter-terrorism efforts. It further instilled a multi-agency approach in this regard. Third, is the 2017 amendment of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (POCAMLA). The amendment of the POCAMLA Act of 2009 complied with the International Financial Action Taskforce (FTF) and the UN Security Council Resolution 1373. This law was geared at countering money laundering and terrorism financing. The 2009 law provided for the establishment of the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC). The 2017 amendment widened the scope of intervention by providing a mandate for among others the monitoring of money laundering carried out in casinos, and real estate dealings including non-governmental organizations (Kamau, 2021). These laws have been applied in the prosecution of terrorism cases even though successful convictions have been minimal. Successful conviction rates have been linked in part to inadequate evidence and prosecution gaps (Kama, 2021).
Launch of the multi-agency approach
One of the cited successes in Kenya’s counter-terrorism evolution has been the increased level of cooperation across security agencies in terms of prevention and response to counter-terrorism. The multi-agency approach involves finding synergies and cooperation across government security agencies and involves information sharing, strategy formulation, and joint formulation in countering terrorism. Before the rollout of the multi-agency approach post-2015, Kenya’s counter-terrorism responses as evidenced by the Westgate and Garissa University attacks security agencies responses were disjointed and lacked coordination. Study participants opined that before 2015, security agencies operated a silo approach in counter-terrorism. Notable progress has been achieved in this regard with enhanced cooperation across government security agencies such as the Kenya Defence Forces, the National Police Service, and the National Intelligence Service. Study participants attributed the working of this approach to sensitization and buy-out across the security agencies, which have enabled this cooperation to work.
Before the rollout of the multi-agency approach, Kenya’s domestic terrorism response was slow and uncoordinated. It has however evolved into proactive efforts to assist the nation to respond to high profile attacks as was demonstrated by the coordinated response to the Dusit D2 attack in 2019 (Muibu & Cubukcu, 2023). Moreover, the SLAA of 2014 further anticipated this cross-agency level of cooperation with clear coordination roles under the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC).
Development of the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism
In 2016, Kenya developed a national strategy to counter violent extremism (NSCVE) which was cascaded to 47 County Action Plans (CAPS). These plans are coordinated by the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC). The implementation of the NSCVE and subsequently CAPs recognized the value of non-state actors in their preventive agenda. As this participant opined:
The launch of the NSCVE Strategy in 2016 marked a shift in approach. This strategy marked the move away from a pure kinetic approach and transferred CT responsibilities to other government agencies and different segments of society through its initial nine pillars of focus. More importantly, it emphasizes a preventive agenda. this became the greatest win for security chiefs as it provides a balanced approach bringing security and societal aspects… NCTC as the coordinating body has made the citizens, different arms of government including Counties that they have a role to play in countering terrorism (Key Informant Interview March 21, 2024).
This agenda fits into the paradigm shift from traditional hard power stances in counter-terrorism and now recognizes the centrality of community engagement and generally the use of non-coercive interventions. This then complements the hard power approaches that correspond to counter-terrorism. Kenya has since 2016 rolled out this agenda that has come to be known as prevention/countering violent extremism (PCVE). The PCVE agenda recognizes the pivotal contribution that governmental actors and community actors can bring to the prevention of violent extremism (Mesok, 2022a; 2022b).
Strengthened Institutional Capacities
One of the notable successes in the study period has been the gradual strengthening of the key institutions involved in counter-terrorism. Earlier evaluations of Kenya’s counter-terrorism often observed that institutional weaknesses were one of the factors that made Kenya vulnerable to terrorism (Mogire & Mkutu, 2011). This has necessitated the support of development partners’ investments in varied training and equipment support to law enforcement and related security agencies. This support has gone to key institutions such as the National Intelligence Service, the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), and the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU). These capacities have resulted in more robust threat assessment, and intelligence gathering and the move towards more preventative action as opposed to reactive measures (Mogire &Mkutu, 2011). The next section of the paper evaluates Counter terrorism challenges.
Challenges
Lack of an overarching counter-terrorism strategy
One of the cited gaps in Kenya’s counter-terrorism architecture is the lack of an overarching counter-terrorism strategy. Instead what the country has is a series of laws and policy regulations that are developed as terrorism dynamics evolve (Kamau, 2021). Developing an overarching counter-terrorism strategy according to a section of participants would help to offer clarity on the strategic direction that the country could take. This would serve as a guiding document that would offer a whole of government approach to strategic interventions to overcome the threats of terrorism.
Trust deficits between security agencies and communities
Community engagement remains critical for counter-terrorism engagements yet it faces several challenges. One is the historic poor-state community historic relationships, particularly in counter-terrorism operations. Study participants observed that this had been more prevalent in parts of the Kenyan Coast and Northern Kenya. Violent extremist organizations have been more active in these two regions (Mahmoud, 2023). Commentators observe that human rights violations in operations further serve to alienate communities from security agencies. There exists documentation around human rights violations during Operation Usalama Watch- in 2014 in Eastleigh and other environs in Nairobi. This intervention was launched in the aftermath of the September 2013 Westgate attacks. There are also concerns that counter-terrorism policing has been marked by arbitrary arrests, illegal detention, and ethnic and religious profiling. The historic securitization of certain communities and religious identities has meant that communities’ cooperation with state agencies has been limited. These interventions are counterproductive and in other words, these actions have eroded political trust between Muslims and the Kenyan state. Furthermore, these actions have also served to radicalize sections of Muslim youth. The net effect of these modes of unaccountable policing has been inadequate state-community relations rendering existing peace infrastructures such as Nyumba Kumi and community policing less effective in supporting counter-terrorism operations (Kamau, 2021, Githigaro, 2023; Mwangi, 2017). The police service for instance needs to shed its historic image in this regard as this participant opined:
The Kenya Police has had a structural challenge since its existence, it has been hard to shed its image as a force and become a service. The police need to change its image, this goes beyond changing the color of the uniform, it has remained hard to shed the image of the force, as it transitions to a service (Key informant interview, March 23, 2024).
Internal vulnerabilities
Study participants cited several internal vulnerabilities that impact Kenya’s counter-terrorism efforts. One is weak state capacities and presence, especially in Kenya’s borderlands. The majority of participants referenced the so-called ‘ungoverned areas’ as partly linked to the threats of terrorism. As this participant recounted:
There exist areas in our country that can be termed as ungoverned spaces. Some areas are too vast with minimal government presence. For instance, in some places, chiefs do not have the reach and the apparatus to understand their terrain. Along the Kenya-Somalia border, some areas are sparsely populated, and therefore Al-Shabaab can live in the bushes, make friendships in local communities, and create allies who can support them with food for example, but also collaborate with locals to the point that they cannot be reported to authorities (Key Informant Interview, March 2024).
The above quote further speaks to the twin challenge of ungoverned spaces but also to the presence of local collaborators which in turn make it difficult for security agencies to detect and pre-empt terrorism threats.
Minimal state presence means that terrorism groups and their local affiliates can operate with ease in the country. This was cited as a key challenge, particularly in parts of Kenya’s northeastern and the Coastal region. A related challenge is that of corruption in state entities such as the National Police Service and the Immigration Department. Corruption facilitates the movement of persons and logistics required to execute attacks (Mogire and Mkutu, 2011).
Insufficient multi-agency coordination
Whereas lessons were learned around the need for inter-agency cooperation following the Westgate and Garissa University attacks, there still exist gaps in this innovative approach. Gaps still exist about inter-agency cooperation (Mwangi, 2017). These challenges largely emanate from divergent doctrines and operational cultures across security agencies. Related challenges include differences in levels of training and equipment (Kamau, 2021). From the perspectives of several study participants, a silo mentality had continued to persist and hence the need to keep innovating on how best to overcome this challenge. As this participant opined:
The residual silo mentality is still very much alive… this is work for NIS, Police, or the Military, information hoarding is still alive… there are instances of petty personalities clashing…. People going to cleavages that are not helpful at all… (Key Informant Interview, April 2024). This participant offered a similar perspective:
The command and control structure has not worked well in some instances, inter-agency competition is a challenge sometimes, and one agency may want to shine… there can be turf wars- especially if an agency produced the information, generally, the issue comes down to a manager’s orientation of vision and knowledge on how to manage competition (Key informant Interview, April 2024).
Returnees reintegration gaps
Following changing conflict dynamics in the region and beyond such as the rise of Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State, the threats of returning foreign fighters (FTFs) became imminent. The government following a securitization logic in the study period has considered FTFs as presenting a security threat. In 2015, the Ministry of Interior announced a blanket amnesty program for the FTFs. This announcement was criticized initially for a lack of policy directions on how rehabilitation and reintegration would proceed (Kamau, 2021). Participants generally acknowledged that reintegration was poorly conceived and in some instances put in harm’s way returnees who took the amnesty offer. As this participant observed:
This was a dead-on-arrival project, the first batch in coastal Kenya, I believe in Kwale some of them were shown on television in the company of a local administrator, and subsequently, some of the returnees were killed, with perceptions that AS was involved. This program also lacked initially a witness protection plan (Key Informant Interview, March 2024).
This policy directive was further critiqued for gaps from a holistic outlook. Some of the cited gaps included insufficient community awareness of returnees’ reintegration into their former societies and insufficient psycho-social support relevant to reintegration (Juma &Githigaro, 2021). As this participant observed the challenges of reintegration speaking to gaps in acceptance and the stigma attached to returnees:
We want these guys to come back to the community… it takes a long time to rehabilitate them… it requires the community to work together, there is also a bit of stigma, and they are also ridiculed and mocked…. Reintegration is one of the tough things to achieve (Key Informant Interview, March 21, 2024).
These critiques are in part being addressed with the development of a policy to guide this previous lacuna. Other lessons would need to be learned on what has worked and has not worked well drawing from other contexts. Several participants caution about the lack of success stories around deradicalization and reintegration globally. As they observed:
Once someone is radicalized, it is very difficult to deradicalize them, at some point a returnee has been in prison, including going through rehabilitation, but you still find them going back to terrorism… I don’t know if it’s the context, the delivery, or the process as these programs are barely scratching the surface (Key Informant Interview, March 2024).
Other cited challenges related to the sustainability of reintegration given their short nature, particularly around social and economic integration. The returnees’ economic integration was noted by a section of participants to be a function of donor funding, further raising questions about the long-term transformation that would be required beyond seed capital to establish a business.
Regional dynamics of terrorism
In the last decade, AS has recruited its operatives from the East African region including Kenya. Other actors with cross-border connections include; the Allied Defense Forces (ADF) which operates mainly in the Uganda-Congo borderlands, and Jabba East Africa with a principal base in Somalia. Since 2017, the growing insurgency in the Cabo Delgado region of Mozambique going by the local name ‘Al-Shabaab’ but distinct from the AS in Somalia known as Ansar al-Sunna Wa Jamma (ASWJ) has security implications for the region. Early projections indicate that some East African nationals (from Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania) have been enjoined in the conflict in Mozambique. With counter-insurgency interventions by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), including Rwanda, there is a further likelihood that foreign fighters may return to their home countries (Patel & Jacqueline Westermann,2018).
Other cited dynamics include the ongoing drawdown of ATMIS troops in Somalia even as the ATMIS mandate is expected to lapse in December 2024. This drawdown according to interviewed participants presents potential security ramifications in the region including Kenya. Whereas ATMIS interventions have helped to liberate large swathes of territory away from the AS, the inadequate capacity of Somali federal forces to occupy and ensure governance in these territories has provided AS an opportunity to increase its reach. As international and regional actors support Somalia forces with capacity strengthening, Kenya and indeed countries in the region need to upscale their efforts to downgrade the reach of the AS. These would include enhancing border controls to respond to the potential threat. Study participants expressed hope that a new force would replace ATMIS even as Somali security forces continued to build their capacity to safeguard their country.
Gaps in Countering Terrorism Financing
One of the cited gaps in counter-terrorism is that of curbing terrorism financing. In March 2024, The US Department of Treasury sanctioned a couple of individuals and businesses operating in Kenya for linkages with Al-Shabaab funding.1 This raises implications on how Kenya laws especially the POCAMLA Act and the related institutions such as the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC) respond to such evolving risks. Before this sanction, in February 2024, Kenya was put on the grey list by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), due to cited weaknesses around curbing money laundering and terrorism financing. Kenya was listed alongside Namibia.2 The challenges lie in the fact that terrorist organizations will avoid using formal banking channels. Instead, they are keen to use alternative platforms such as a cash system and or the use of proxy businesses to enable their facilitation. One study participant further observed that Kenya had predominantly paid attention to the rollout of kinetic and soft power approaches to the neglect of countering Al- Shabaab‘s expansive financing modalities. As they observed:
As a country, we have focused on the kinetic and soft power approaches but we have to cut the funding of AS… we are doing zero work in my view at the moment… we have the FRC, and we have all the tools in place, as a civilian, I am not privy to the monitoring of financial inflows…. the recent listing by the FATF and the sanctions of the US State Department of Treasury opens a new front on our responses…. I would not be surprised that corruption could have had a hand behind the scenes with the inflows going directly or indirectly to support AS terrorism. This is a gap that needs to be closed (Key Informant Interview, March 21, 2024).
Inadequate community awareness of terrorism threats
Field findings indicate that general community awareness has remained low around the threats posed by terrorism. The higher levels of awareness are largely in contexts where the threats have been more prevalent such as parts of north eastern and coast. Enhanced community awareness would lead to participant views better cooperation with security agencies. As this participant opined:
Sensitization of communities about the threats of terrorism is important as the role that they can play in securing the nation… the people and security agencies should therefore collaborate… the community is expected to inform security agencies of suspicious characters in their localities… this is where community policing is important (Key informant Interview, March 2024).
1 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2168
2 https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/23/fatf-financial-crime-watchdog-adds-kenya-and-namibia-to-its-grey-list.html (accessed 22 April 2024)
The above participant is making the case that once communities are sensitized to terrorism threats, it is then expected that they will cooperate with security agencies. This cooperation however would have to reflect on the existing trust deficits between communities and state agencies. The buy-in by communities therefore remains crucial as part of enhancing its response. As this participant observed:
The biggest loophole is winning the hearts and minds of communities, particularly in places known to harbor terror suspects…. the view that communities are harboring such suspects indicates that there is yet to be proper buy-in by the government (Key informant Interview, April 2024).
Changing modus operandi of Al- Shabaab
One of the cited challenges around counter-terrorism as expressed by study participants has been the changing modus operandi of the Al-Shabaab. Owing to increased surveillance by security agencies, AS has been innovating on diverse strategic operations to expand its reach, with inadequate countermeasures to respond to the threat. Participants cited several emerging trends in use by AS. One has been the increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which have largely been targeted at security agencies and infrastructure. Secondly, there has been an expansion of its recruitment geography by targeting non-traditional regions including the establishment of terrorism recruitment nodes in places such as Nyeri, Isebania, and Busia. Previously, AS recruitment was mostly concentrated in parts of Nairobi such as Majengo, northeastern and coastal Kenya aided in part by religious ideologues that capitalized on perceived or real layers of marginalization in these regions. Tied to this has been a pattern where elements of their leadership drew in Kenyans, further appealing to recruitment in Kenya. An example was cited of Ahmed Imani Ali initially the leader of the Pumwani-based Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) named as an Emir of then Al-Hijra wing in 2012 of
AS with responsibilities for Kenyan operations. Al-Hijra operations were however curtailed by Kenyan authorities by 2013, even though Ali has been critical over the years in directing Kenyan operations.3, Between 2008 and 2012, the Ali agency through the MYC was responsible for the recruitment of hundreds of Kenyan youth largely from the Majengo area of Nairobi to Somalia (Field notes, 2024). Third AS has adapted the use of technology by relying on drones for surveillance but also to record their successes. As this participant opined:
Al-Shabaab is using drones in parts of northeastern Kenya and coastal areas bordering Somalia, and internally in Somalia. They are relying on this technology for surveillance but also to record successful attacks, the latter is used for propaganda and recruitment (Key informant Interview March 2024).
Fourth as is typical of other terrorist organizations, they are not only interested in general cadres of fighters but are now looking to recruit specialists in their ranks such as medical specialists and technical expertise. As this participant emphasized:
AS recruitment has been shifting, they are looking for guys in universities with specialized skills as per specific needs at the time…. these needs could include medicine, technicians, and so on. Some of these recruiters as disguised as jobs in places such as the Sudan and or the Middle East with excellent pay incentives in dollars, only for them to be drugged and find themselves in Somalia against their will (Key Informant Interview, March 2024).
The next section of the paper examines some recommendations to enhance counter-terrorism responses.
Enhancing Counter-Terrorism Responses in Kenya
This section of the paper discusses recommendations geared towards enhancing counter-terrorism responses in Kenya.
Strengthening Multi-Agency Approach
In the majority of the key informant interviews, there was a call that the multi- agency approach required continuous enhancement by overcoming some of the persistent silo approaches and agencies’ rivalry to surmount the threats of terrorism. These silo approaches in the views of interviewed participants have
3 https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2023/03/shabaab-leadership.php
been among others a result of inter-agency trust deficits and perceived superiority around specific agencies. As this participant observed, ‘Multi-agency cooperation must be at peak at all times, terrorism is here with us,’ (Key informant interview, April 2024).
Other cited areas of improvement include the need for proactive interventions tasked to a specific agency through this cooperation. A section of participants opined that some agencies were lagging in taking required actions which in turn would impact cooperation in the fight against terrorism. In other words, what these participants were suggesting is that all agencies should do their part to minimize threats. Part of the inaction and or perceived negligence had to do with the command and control structure where inter-agency competition is rife. As this participant noted:
Competition is a challenge in the multi-agency approach, one agency may want to shine, there might be turf wars about which agency produced the information, and sometimes it’s the failure to allocate what roles each agency has to do. In other instances, it is the failure of leadership… this can be the case of a manager who is not updated with the multi-agency vision or has inadequate coordination skills (Key Informant Interview, March 2024).
Moving forward, a participant recommended that synergy within the multi-agency approach could be enhanced through ‘standardization in terms of training, practices, tactics and strategies’ (Key informant Interview, March 2024).
Entrenching a whole of government and a whole-of-society approach in countering terrorism
Study participants expressed the need for continuous innovation in the entrenching of the whole government and whole-of-society approach in addressing the threats of terrorism. This approach includes government and non-state actors’ cooperation in countering terrorism. There was an acknowledgment by a cross-section of the participants that the rollout of the NSCVE Strategy had raised increased awareness and indeed a paradigm shift around the value of cooperation between state and non-state actors. This was further informed by the realization that the threats of terrorism cannot be dealt with by governments alone. A section of participants cited the need for increased sensitization across civilians and security agencies to optimize the roles they could play. As this participant pointed out:
There should be training for both civilians and security agencies to be on the same line in understanding terror-related threats. Whether it is facilitation, recruitment, issues of collaboration, or training to understand the dynamics of suspicious activities that might be linked to terrorism in their locality (Key Informant Interview, March 2024).
The optimal involvement of the non-state actors in this domain however needs to overcome the persistent trust deficits that have continued to impact community- security agencies’ cooperation. The trust deficits as elaborated elsewhere have continued to be influenced by unaccountable policing that has included poor institutional culture and human rights violations. Furthermore, the continuous securitization of Muslim communities as responsible for terrorism threats has further served to minimize genuine state-community cooperation (Omeje & Githigaro, 2012). The adoption of a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach would further support in dealing with challenges such as those posed in the reintegration of returning foreign fighters. The returnees as they referred to in the literature require governments, communities, and non-state actors to deal with such questions as community acceptance, but also the attendant psycho-social support required for their rehabilitation and reintegration. A proper legal basis would be needed so to anchor reintegration interventions in law. In bringing together a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, the development of an overarching counter-terrorism strategy would better anchor all the policies and interventions.
Countering Terrorism Financing
Study participants expressed the need to close gaps around terrorism financing which enables the mobility and reach of terrorist organizations. Kenya’s recent greylisting in February 2024, by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), due to cited weaknesses around curbing money laundering and terrorism financing requires appropriate policy responses. Some of the policy interventions would include tightening the regulatory landscapes around key institutions such as the Financial Reporting Centre, including the Central Bank and the National Treasury. There has been notable progress by the government of Kenya in this respect. This includes the AML/CFT (Amendment) Act of 2023 and the amendment of Proceeds of Crimes and Anti-Money Laundering Regulations of 2013. Other areas of regulatory enhancement include the designation of lawyers through the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) as reporting entities under the POCAMLA Act which
took effect on March 15, 2023. Continuous risk assessment, capacity enhancement, and coordination across relevant government agencies and international cooperation remain paramount in addressing deficiencies that resulted in the greylisting.4
Capacity training and enhancement of equipment for security agencies
While cognizant that there have been progressive investments in both training and equipment, participants called for more enhancement. This included enhancing the human resources of key agencies such as NCTC which is critical to the rollout of the NSCVE. Whereas participants lauded progressive security investments around equipment, there was a concern raised about the quality of some of the procured armored personnel carriers (APCs). This concern was raised against the backdrop of extensive damage when in contact with IEDs. Other deficits that need to be addressed for security agencies include training on emerging trends such as online radicalization, and future threat analysis in such areas as cyber terrorism.
From a human resource perspective, relevant government agencies need to prioritize the mental wellness of security agencies from the training curriculum to the practical everyday work. This then closes gaps around inadequate psycho-social support that is often manifested in officers developing post-traumatic stress disorders (PSTD) which then impacts how they provide security (Key informant Interview, March 21, 2024).
Increased public awareness of terrorism threats
Study participants observed that inadequate public awareness of the threats of terrorism and violent extremism had been hampering counter-terrorism initiatives. Multiple participants called for enhanced public education campaigns to bring citizens up to speed on the threats posed by terrorism and the role that they can play in the fight against terrorism. The levels of threat awareness were however deemed to be contextual and varied across Counties. Counties that have experienced terror attacks such as those in northeastern Kenya (Garissa, Mandera, Wajir) and parts of the Coast such as Lamu and Mombasa had higher levels of
4 https://www.treasury.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Scanb-CS2.pdf
awareness. Enhanced awareness would need to be contextual and participatory in the spirit of whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches in messaging. Some of the study participants highlighted the place of art-based approaches such as the use of music, drama, and film to raise this awareness, especially among young people. In addition, they cited the place of mainstream media in amplifying public messaging on the terrorism threats and the levels of cooperation required.
Strengthening local peace infrastructures
Study participants noted the need to enhance the working of existing peace infrastructures such as Nyumba Kumi and community policing. These interventions can be tapped to support counter-terrorism initiatives. They offer opportunities for risk assessment, information sharing, and increasing community awareness around terrorism. For their effectiveness, however, there is a need to situate how to build layers of trust between communities and security agencies. There is an additional need to sensitize communities around the value of such engagements particularly around Nyumba Kumi as this participant remarked:
Nyumba Kumi is a total failure in the northeast and coastal areas of Kenya where there is a presence of terrorism sympathizers… moreover, in urban spaces, Nyumba Kumi has failed to take off due to the don’t care attitudes of residents, we hardly know our neighbors (Key informant Interview, April 2024).
Anticipating future terrorism trends
Given the changing nature of violent extremism, forecasting future threats analysis was deemed important as part of pre-emptive interventions. Study participants called on the need to be cognizant of new dynamics such as online radicalization, lone wolf terrorism, and the rise of cyber terrorism. Other threat analyses were linked to a slowed economic growth trajectory that created vulnerabilities that could be exploited by AS and related actors. While contested in the literature, scholars have argued the linkages between poverty and terrorism. Whereas it is difficult to make causal linkages between these two variables, an environment marked by economic deprivation provides an opportunity for violent extremist groups to recruit using financial incentives. In terms of cyber terrorism, participants evaluated that shortly terrorist organizations including AS would have
the capacity to disrupt digital government infrastructures such as hacking websites to disrupt services but also to leverage much more on the use of technology to recruit, plan, and fundraise for their activities using cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoins. The implications particularly for cyber terrorism is to invest robustly in cyber security both in terms of human expertise and technology to minimize threats.
Conclusion and Study Implications
This working paper has been focused on appraising the working of counter- terrorism policies in Kenya for the past 12 years. It finds that as terror threats have evolved, government response has also been innovative. The government responses in the study period have included the development of legislative frameworks, Somalia’s stabilization process, the roll-out of the multi-agency approach, the development of a national countering violent extremism strategy, and the embrace of a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches. The paper has also explored several challenges that need to be closed if counter- terrorism approaches are to be enhanced. These include the need to revitalize the multi-agency approach, close gaps around terrorism financing, enhance community awareness, and strengthen community cooperation. The latter has particularly impacted the nature of cooperation, particularly among constituencies and or identities that have been securitized for terrorism. This has in turn eroded trust. Unfair and biased counter-terrorism practices can further drive alienation from communities that have been previously victimized by the state. Communities in Kenya’s northeast, the Coastal part, and parts of Nairobi (Muibu & Cubukcu, 2023). The paper further calls on the need for the government of Kenya to anticipate several emerging dynamics that would imply her counter-terrorism posture. This includes anticipating the post-ATMIS mandate beyond December 2024, while anticipating future cyber terrorism threats from AS even as they adapt to new technologies. The paper in closing calls for the development of an overarching counter-terrorism strategy that would offer a guiding framework for CT efforts.
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