In societies where democratic competition remains fragile, elections are rarely confined to a single day at the ballot. They unfold as extended risk cycles in which pre-existing social tensions, institutional weaknesses, political interests, and resource pressure interact over time. Treating elections as one-off events masks these undercurrents and limits the ability of governments, development partners, civil society, and the private sector to anticipate instability and prevent escalation.
Across the Greater Eastern Africa region, this perspective is not theoretical. It shapes how institutions prepare, how resources are deployed, and how risks are managed before, during, and after electoral contests. Kenya, where the 2027 general election is on the horizon, offers a useful illustration.
Kenya’s Electorate: A History of Recurrent Tension
Kenya’s experience since the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1991 clearly illustrates why elections must be treated as cycles rather than events. The 1992 general elections, the country’s first competitive contest after decades of single-party rule, were characterised by targeted intimidation and inter-ethnic clashes, mainly in the Rift Valley. The violence pointed to deep-seated struggles over political power, land, and state resources, activated during a period of political transition. Similar dynamics have resurfaced in subsequent electoral cycles.
The 2007–2008 post-election crisis stands as Kenya’s most devastating electoral risk cycle. A disputed presidential result triggered inter-ethnic violence that rapidly escalated: leaving over 1,000 people dead and hundreds of thousands displaced. This was not a mere election crisis but the culmination of tensions that had simmered for years, and which continued to shape political relations long after the immediate violence subsided.
Subsequent reforms – including the 2010 Constitution and institutional changes – reduced the scale of violence in 2013 and later elections, but localized clashes, gang mobilisation, heavy-handed security responses, and mistrust between citizens and institutions persisted through the 2017 and 2022 cycles.
Historically, electioneering periods in Kenya coincide with spikes in civil unrest compared with non-electoral periods. The lesson is clear: electoral risk unfolds in cycles that begin well before polling day and often lingers long after results are declared.
What Turns Elections into Risk Cycles?
Several structural forces explain why elections repeatedly generate periods of heightened vulnerability. First, deep social and economic fault lines often criss-cross political competition. In Kenya, electoral mobilisation has perennially drawn on ethnic identity and perceptions of exclusion, transforming political contests into struggles over access, security, and survival rather than policy choice.
Second, a decline in institutional trust plays a central role. The electoral management body, the Judiciary, and security agencies act as key stabilisers during elections. When their neutrality or effectiveness is questioned – as was the case in 2007 – disputes escalate more quickly and are harder to contain.
Third, organised violent actors rarely emerge suddenly at election time. Ethnic militias and mobilised gangs often exist throughout inter-election periods and are activated when political payoffs peak. Their presence reflects broader governance and accountability gaps rather than election-day failures alone.
Finally, information environments matter. The speed and reach of digital platforms have reshaped how inflammatory narratives, rumours and grievances spread. In Kenya, seasons of intense political competition are often marked by a surge in polarising narratives that can easily trigger physical violence.
Beyond Kenya: Regional Cycles of Electoral Risk
While Kenya’s electoral cycles have been among the most analysed, similar patterns are evident across the Greater Eastern Africa region, albeit shaped by different political and institutional contexts.
Uganda’s 2026 elections sparked protests, clashes, and contested outcomes, reflecting long-standing incumbency and restricted political space. In Tanzania, disputed elections and deadly post-election repression in 2025 illustrated how constrained political space and dictatorship can trigger protracted unrest cycles beyond the ballot.
In Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, elections often happen amid ongoing conflict and unstable governance. In such settings, electoral processes intensify existing fragility rather than resolve it. Madagascar’s history of disputed political transitions further underscores how electoral risk can be manifested outside traditional conflict hotspots.
Even in countries with lower recorded levels of electoral violence – such as Rwanda, Eritrea, Seychelles, Mauritius, Comoros, Djibouti, and Burundi – elections remain moments when political pressures saturate and legitimacy is tested.
Implications for Security Foresight and Policy
Viewing elections as risk cycles carries important implications. Risk assessment must be long-term, tracking diverse factors across the full electoral period, not just polling day. Prevention efforts must be sustained; they should go beyond campaigns and voting to also focus on periods when tensions incubate. Above all, institutional credibility and mediation capacity remain central to limiting escalation.
For governments, multilateral agencies, NGOs, and private sector actors operating in politically sensitive environments, elections should thus be seen as extended windows of risk vulnerability requiring continuous analysis and preparedness.
Conclusion: Preparing for Electoral Risk Cycles
Elections in Greater Eastern Africa are best perceived not as isolated events, but as complex risk cycles in which political, social, economic, and security dynamics intersect over time. Kenya’s history, alongside those of her neighbours, demonstrate that failure to embrace this reality leaves institutions reactive rather than prepared.
This is where security foresight becomes essential. At Mashariki Research and Policy Centre, we are driven by a clear conviction that securing elections means managing cycles – not events. Our work supports organisations in anticipating and navigating electoral risk cycles through structured analysis, scenario planning, and tools such as the Conflict Vulnerability Index-Kenya. This is predictive, data-driven tool designed to map vulnerability patterns across Kenya ahead of the 2027 elections. By identifying patterns of vulnerability over time, such approaches help governments, development partners, civil society, and businesses make earlier, more informed decisions. The objective is not prediction, but preparedness-strengthening institutional capacity to manage electoral risk before it escalates into crisis.