China’s Zero Tariff Policy: Implications for Africa’s Economic Future

Introduction

On June 11, 2025 at the China–Africa Economic and Trade Expo in Changsha, China announced a sweeping trade commitment to remove all tariffs on exports from 53 African countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2025). This move grants African nations duty-free access to the world’s second-largest economy, potentially lowering export costs and making African goods more competitive in the Chinese market. For the first time, this access would extend not only to the least developed economies but also to middle-income countries such as South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, and Egypt (Reuters, 2025). The announcement was framed as a gesture of South–South solidarity, offering African exporters access to a consumer market of 1.4 billion people and a global economic powerhouse. But is this offer truly a breakthrough for Africa’s trade ambitions or the beginning of a deeper economic entanglement disguised as cooperation?

This pledge comes at a pivotal moment. With uncertainty looming over the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), China is moving swiftly to assert itself as the continent’s most strategic partner. Tariff elimination may appear generous, but it is also calculated(Reuters,2025). It reflects a broader effort to restructure global trade networks, deepen influence in the Global South, and secure long-term resource flows. For African countries, the real question is whether they will shape the terms of engagement or be shaped by them. The absence of a deliberate strategy risks exclusion and structural dependency, making the promise of transformation increasingly elusive.

This commentary seeks to critically examine what China’s zero tariff policy portends for Africa’s trade future and explore the structural reforms needed to ensure that expanded access translates into long-term economic transformation.

Key Issues

1. Persistent Structural Asymmetry in Africa–China Trade
   Africa–China trade expanded from 11.67 billion dollars in 2000 to 257.67 billion dollars in 2022, positioning China as the continent’s leading trading partner (China–Africa Economic Bulletin, 2024). However, the structure of this trade remains fundamentally unbalanced. Between 2000 and 2022, 89 percent of Africa’s exports to China consisted of extractive commodities such as oil, copper, iron ore, and alumina, while 94 percent of imports from China were manufactured goods including telecommunications equipment and textiles (China–Africa Economic Bulletin, 2024). In 2022 alone, Africa imported goods worth 164 billion dollars from China but exported only 96 billion dollars in return.
   This persistent trade gap reflects structural dependency, where African economies function primarily as suppliers of low-value raw inputs while relying heavily on high-value imports.

   

   Figure 1 illustrates this imbalance, with China’s exports to Africa consistently exceeding imports since 2005. Tariff removal will not automatically alter this pattern. The absence of industrial capacity and the slow pace of investment in value addition continue to limit Africa’s ability to transition from extractive to transformative trade. Countries such as Angola, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo typify this trajectory by exporting substantial mineral resources with limited local processing. As dependency theory suggests, market access unaccompanied by structural change entrenches rather than resolves underdevelopment (Amin, S. 1976).

2. Unequal Gains and the Capacity Gap across African States
   Although 53 African countries are included in the tariff policy, the benefits are unlikely to be equitably distributed. Economies such as South Africa, Egypt, Kenya, and Morocco already possess superior export infrastructure, institutional readiness, and diversified manufacturing bases (UNCTAD, 2023). These countries are well-positioned to leverage tariff-free access. In contrast, low-income, landlocked, and post-conflict states face significant barriers to participation, including poor logistics, limited customs capacity, and low product competitiveness.

   According to SAIS-CARI (2023), just ten countries accounted for over 80 percent of Africa’s exports to China. This disparity may widen unless targeted policies support lagging economies. Furthermore, the policy does not include provisions for gender equity or SME participation, despite evidence that women-led enterprises and informal producers dominate sectors such as agriculture and textiles. In the absence of inclusive mechanisms, the tariff policy risks entrenching existing inequalities, both across and within African states.

   

3. Dumping, Deindustrialization, and the Need for Trade Safeguards
   Although several frameworks support youth involvement in peacebuilding, such as the AU’s Youth, Peace, and Security Agenda and the “Silencing the Guns” initiative, implementation has been inadequate. Many strategies remain top-down and disconnected from youth realities on the ground (Amani Africa, 2024). Without localized and inclusive mechanisms, these policies fail to achieve a sustainable impact. In many cases, these frameworks fail to resonate with local youth, as policies are not adapted to their specific needs or contexts, limiting their impact on peacebuilding and security.

   For African BRICS members such as South Africa, Egypt, and Ethiopia, this moment presents both leverage and risk. These countries can use their positions to push for institutional reforms within BRICS that forster more equitable trade and shield vulnerable economies from exploitation. However, coordination with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is essential. If BRICS engagement becomes siloed, it risks undermining the collective bargaining power that AfCFTA was designed to secure. Strengthening synergies between BRICS and AfCFTA could provide a powerful counterweight to unilateral trade dependency and promote a more unified African trade voice in global forums.

   

4. Geopolitical Positioning and the BRICS–AfCFTA Trade Axis
   China’s tariff policy must also be understood through a geopolitical lens. It is a strategic tool for advancing soft power, securing supply chains, and countering Western-led trade initiatives such as the United States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Through tariff removal, China reinforces its image as an economic partner rather than a lender, at a time when criticism of its debt diplomacy is growing. The 30 billion dollar credit pledge offered alongside the tariff reforms signals a deeper entrenchment of China’s economic footprint in Africa (Baker, 2024).
   

Conclusion

China’s zero tariff regime represents a strategic inflection point for Africa. It reflects both an opportunity to deepen trade relations and a challenge to rethink the continent’s economic trajectory. On the surface, tariff elimination signals inclusion and partnership. Yet beneath this gesture lie deeper implications of asymmetry, dependency, and power consolidation. If Africa approaches this policy without coordination, regulation, and strategic alignment, it risks becoming a supplier of raw materials and a dumping ground for foreign goods. However, if African leaders leverage regional institutions, invest in inclusive industrial policy, and embed safeguards, the continent can convert market access into structural transformation. The continent’s future in China–Africa trade depends not on tariff generosity but on its capacity to negotiate terms, enforce safeguards, and drive industrialization from within.

Policy Recommendations

1. Develop Sector-Specific Export Strategies with Value Addition Targets.
   Africa should prioritise investment in agro-processing, textiles, and digital services to reduce overreliance on raw exports and meet Chinese quality standards.
   
2. Empower SMEs, Women, and Youth in Export-Ready Sectors.
   Targeted support for informal producers and women-led businesses will increase inclusive participation in trade and reduce the concentration of gains.
3. Establish a Continental Anti-Dumping and Safeguards Framework.
   African Union should accelerate the formation of trade remedies institutions to monitor unfair competition, especially in sensitive sectors such as steel and apparel.
   
   
4. Use BRICS and AfCFTA Platforms to Harmonise Trade Negotiations.
   African states should not negotiate alone. Coordinated bargaining through BRICS and AfCFTA institutions will help reduce exposure to bilateral imbalances and strengthen collective resilience.

References

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