



1.0 Introduction

The month of June 2026 underscored the growing interaction between conflict, geopolitical competition, and environmental pressures as interconnected drivers of security across the Greater Eastern Africa region. Although these dynamics varied in intensity across the region, developments during the reporting period demonstrated that localized crises increasingly generated cross-border implications for governance, economic resilience, humanitarian conditions, and regional cooperation (African Union Commission (AUC), 2026; Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 2026). Concurrently, intensifying external engagement in infrastructure, strategic resources, maritime connectivity, and digital networks continued to reshape regional alignments, while persistent climate variability compounded existing governance and human security vulnerabilities (United Nations, 2026; IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC), 2026). Viewed through a security foresight lens, these converging dynamics point to an increasingly complex operating environment in which political instability, external strategic competition, and environmental stress reinforce one another rather than emerge as isolated sources of insecurity. This Outlook provides a concise, evidence-based assessment of developments recorded during the month June 2026, examining their implications for Conflict Trends, Geopolitics, and Environmental and Climate Security, while identifying emerging risks likely to shape regional stability across Greater Eastern Africa.

2.0 Thematic Focus

2.1 Conflict Trends

Conflict dynamics across Greater Eastern Africa during the month of June 2026 were characterised by institutional fragmentation and contested political legitimacy rather than conventional interstate warfare. In Somalia, armed clashes in Mogadishu involving government-aligned forces and opposition-linked armed actors intensified urban insecurity, disrupted government operations, and heightened concerns over state authority, civilian protection, and continuity of public administration (Al Jazeera, 2026; Reuters, 2026). The deterioration in the capital reflected broader challenges confronting Somalia's state-building efforts, particularly the interaction between political contestation and persistent insurgent activity, which continued to undermine governance effectiveness and humanitarian access (United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), 2026; Reuters, 2026).

In Sudan, the expansion of parallel currency circulation within Rapid Support Forces (RSF)-controlled territories institutionalised territorial fragmentation by embedding separate monetary governance within the wider conflict economy, complicating humanitarian access while further reducing prospects for future institutional reunification (Reuters, 2026; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 2026). Continued fighting and competing administrative systems reinforced the fragmentation of state institutions, increasing displacement pressures and constraining humanitarian operations across conflict-affected regions (UNOCHA, 2026; International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2026).

In Uganda, security operations targeting media institutions and political actors narrowed civic space and heightened governance-related conflict risks by increasing tensions between state security institutions, political opposition, and civil society (Pan African Visions, 2026; Reuters, 2026). South Sudan's preparations for the December 2026 elections advanced amid unresolved elite rivalries, delayed implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement, and longstanding militarised political competition, sustaining a high risk of pre-electoral instability (Reuters, 2026; United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 2026). In Ethiopia, post-election political consolidation continued alongside persistent insecurity in peripheral regions, illustrating uneven state authority and enduring localised armed resistance despite progress in national political processes (Reuters, 2026; International Crisis Group, 2026). Taken together, these developments illustrated a regional pattern in which contested governance, armed fragmentation,

and political transition increasingly reinforced cross-border displacement, institutional strain, and persistent security volatility across Greater Eastern Africa (African Union Commission, 2026; Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 2026).

Foresight Recommendations

- IGAD should establish a Somalia Urban Stabilisation Initiative within the next 90 days to coordinate ceasefire monitoring, community dialogue, and disruption of armed financing networks in Mogadishu through joint engagement with Somali authorities, local stakeholders, and international partners.
- The African Union Peace and Security Council should establish a dedicated monitoring mechanism for Sudan's parallel financial systems, working with humanitarian agencies and regional financial institutions to limit conflict-economy expansion while safeguarding civilian access to essential services.
- The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, working with Uganda's oversight institutions, should strengthen monitoring of civic space, detention practices, and media freedom through regular public reporting and structured engagement with national authorities.
- The African Union and IGAD should jointly deploy an electoral security support mission to South Sudan through coordinated election-security planning, border monitoring, and preventive mediation among political stakeholders before the commencement of the electoral period.

Forward-Looking Scenario: Conflict dynamics are expected to remain concentrated within states experiencing contested political authority rather than evolving into direct interstate confrontation. Somalia and Sudan face the highest probability of sustained institutional fragmentation, while South Sudan's electoral timetable may intensify localised insecurity if political disputes remain unresolved. Population displacement and informal armed mobility are expected to increase along the Ethiopia-Sudan-South Sudan corridor, placing additional humanitarian and security pressure on neighbouring states, particularly Kenya.

2.2 Geopolitical Shifts

Geopolitical competition during June 2026 centred on infrastructure investment, strategic resource governance, and maritime connectivity as external and regional actors sought to consolidate their influence across Greater Eastern Africa. In Kenya, a US\$1.2 billion airport expansion agreement involving a Chinese state-linked contractor coincided with deepening engagement with the United States on critical minerals, illustrating Kenya's increasing use of diversified external partnerships to preserve investment flexibility while reducing dependence on any single strategic partner (Reuters, 2026a; Business Insider Africa, 2026). This dual-track engagement reflects a broader regional trend in which governments are leveraging strategic competition among major powers to advance national infrastructure and economic priorities while maintaining diplomatic autonomy (African Union Commission (AUC), 2026).

Regional economic integration also advanced through strategic infrastructure cooperation. Rwanda's fuel import agreement through Kenya's transport and logistics corridor reinforced Kenya's role as a regional energy transit hub while strengthening cross-border supply chain resilience and economic interdependence within the East African region (Reuters, 2026b; Government of Rwanda, 2026). The agreement further demonstrated the growing geopolitical significance of transport corridors as instruments of regional economic influence and strategic connectivity (Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 2026).

In the Horn of Africa, Somalia's diplomatic engagement with the European Union was complicated by visa restrictions linked to migration cooperation and return policy negotiations, underscoring the increasing use of migration governance as an instrument of external political leverage in EU-Horn relations (Al Jazeera, 2026; European Commission, 2026). Migration management continues to evolve beyond a humanitarian concern into a strategic component of international bargaining, shaping development cooperation, mobility partnerships, and broader diplomatic engagement between Europe and African states (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2026).

Meanwhile, Ethiopia's continued progress toward sovereign debt restructuring signalled gradual reintegration into international financial frameworks, improving investor confidence while reflecting the influence of international financial institutions on domestic economic governance (Reuters, 2026c; International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2026). At the same time, Djibouti's concentration of submarine cable infrastructure reinforced its position as one of Africa's most strategically significant maritime and digital gateways, where infrastructure resilience has become increasingly important for regional

commerce, digital connectivity, and global data transmission (International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 2026; World Bank, 2026). Collectively, these developments signalled an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment in which infrastructure, finance, logistics, digital connectivity, and strategic resources have become central instruments through which external powers project influence across Greater Eastern Africa (AUC, 2026; IGAD, 2026).

Foresight Recommendations

- The African Union and IGAD should establish a regional infrastructure coordination mechanism to monitor external financing across transport, energy, maritime, and digital sectors, promoting transparency and reducing fragmented bilateral dependency.
- Kenya's National Treasury and relevant economic planning institutions should introduce strategic risk assessments for major infrastructure investments to strengthen debt sustainability, protect national assets, and maintain policy autonomy amid competing external partnerships.
- The European Union and Somalia should establish a structured migration dialogue that links return policy implementation with capacity-building, development assistance, and humanitarian support to reduce diplomatic friction while strengthening migration governance.
- Djibouti, regional telecommunications operators, and maritime security partners should develop a coordinated submarine cable protection framework combining infrastructure monitoring, contingency planning, and information sharing to strengthen regional digital resilience.

Forward-Looking Scenario: Competition for influence across transport, energy, digital, and maritime infrastructure is expected to intensify as external powers expand their engagement across Greater Eastern Africa. Regional governments are likely to diversify international partnerships rather than align exclusively with a single external actor, increasing diplomatic flexibility while creating more complex coordination challenges for regional institutions. Maritime and digital infrastructure will remain among the region's most strategically sensitive assets, while competition over critical minerals and logistics corridors is expected to become increasingly prominent in shaping regional geopolitical dynamics.

2.3 Environmental Security

Environmental and climate pressures during June 2026 continued to intensify livelihood vulnerability across Greater Eastern Africa, where rainfall variability, recurrent water stress, and rising food prices placed increasing pressure on agricultural production, pastoral systems, and household resilience (IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC), 2026; Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 2026). Seasonal climate forecasts projected above-average temperatures across much of the Greater Horn of Africa alongside uneven rainfall distribution, increasing the likelihood of drought conditions in some areas while elevating flood risks in others (ICPAC, 2026; World Meteorological Organization (WMO), 2026).

In Rwanda, rainfall variability affected agricultural productivity in several farming areas, highlighting the continued sensitivity of smallholder production systems to changing climatic conditions (FAO, 2026; International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2026). Tanzania similarly experienced seasonal resource pressures that heightened water and food insecurity in vulnerable communities, particularly where climate variability interacted with existing socioeconomic vulnerabilities (World Food Programme (WFP), 2026; FAO, 2026). These developments reinforced concerns that climate variability is increasingly undermining rural livelihoods and placing additional pressure on national adaptation capacities.

Across the Horn of Africa, climatic variability intensified displacement risks within pastoral corridors linking Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia, where changing livestock mobility patterns increasingly intersected with governance

gaps, resource competition, and local security challenges (ICPAC, 2026; International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2026). In Sudan, conflict-related disruption of agricultural production further constrained food availability, reinforcing the interaction between environmental stress, conflict economies, and acute food insecurity (FAO & WFP, 2026; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 2026). The deterioration of agricultural livelihoods continued to increase humanitarian needs while reducing community resilience in conflict-affected areas (UNOCHA, 2026; WFP, 2026).

Hydrological pressures affecting the Nile and Great Lakes basins continued to shape resource interdependence among Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and downstream states, underscoring the strategic importance of transboundary water governance under conditions of increasing climate uncertainty (Nile Basin Initiative, 2026; ICPAC, 2026). Taken together, these developments demonstrated that environmental pressures are increasingly functioning as structural drivers of livelihood insecurity, human mobility, governance stress, and humanitarian vulnerability rather than isolated climatic events (United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2026; IGAD, 2026).

Foresight Recommendations

- IGAD should expand regional climate adaptation initiatives by strengthening transboundary pastoral mobility corridors through integrated early warning systems, shared climate information, and coordinated cross-border resource management.
- National governments should prioritise investment in climate-resilient water infrastructure within peri-urban and drought-prone areas by improving storage capacity, demand management, and local contingency planning to reduce seasonal vulnerability.
- Humanitarian agencies and national authorities should strengthen conflict-sensitive food security programmes in Sudan and South Sudan through coordinated distribution systems that protect vulnerable populations while minimising market distortion and local tensions.
- Regional development partners should prioritise climate finance for decentralised irrigation, sustainable water management, and smallholder resilience programmes to strengthen local adaptive capacity and reduce long-term livelihood vulnerability.

Forward-Looking Scenario: Climate variability is expected to intensify seasonal pressure on pastoral livelihoods, agricultural production, and shared water systems across Greater Eastern Africa. Population mobility linked to environmental stress is likely to increase in border regions where governance capacity remains limited, particularly where climate shocks intersect with existing conflict dynamics. Environmental pressures are expected to amplify governance fragility, humanitarian needs, and livelihood insecurity, increasing the likelihood of localised resource tensions and placing additional demands on national and regional response mechanisms.

3.0 Conclusion

June 2026 reinforced an increasingly interconnected security environment across Greater Eastern Africa, where conflict dynamics, geopolitical competition, and environmental pressures interacted to shape regional stability. Rather than emerging as isolated developments, these dynamics collectively demonstrated how governance fragility, external strategic engagement, and climate-related stress increasingly reinforce one another, generating complex and mutually reinforcing security risks across national boundaries.

Conflict remained concentrated in states experiencing contested political authority, with institutional fragmentation in Somalia and Sudan, political transition in South Sudan and Ethiopia, and governance-related tensions in Uganda illustrating the persistence of internal drivers of instability. At the same time, intensifying geopolitical competition over infrastructure, strategic resources, maritime access, and digital connectivity highlighted the region's growing strategic importance within broader global power competition. Concurrently, climate variability continued to exacerbate livelihood insecurity, displacement, and resource pressures, further amplifying existing governance and humanitarian challenges.

Looking ahead, the interaction between political stability, infrastructure governance, and environmental pressures is expected to become more pronounced, increasing the importance of coordinated regional responses capable of anticipating interconnected risks before they evolve into broader security challenges. Strengthening regional cooperation, enhancing institutional resilience, and adopting integrated, forward-looking approaches to conflict prevention, geopolitical engagement, and climate adaptation will remain essential to sustaining peace, stability, and resilience across Greater Eastern Africa.

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