Somalia has long faced security challenges, exacerbated by the presence of terror groups like Al-Shabaab (AS) and the challenges of state fragility. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which commenced operations in 2007 played a pivotal role in stabilizing the country and leading successive counter-terrorism operations against the AS. However, the recent transition to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in April 2022 has raised concerns about Somalia’s ability to ensure security independently, as ATMIS plans to exit Somalia by December 2024 and hand over security responsibilities to the Somalia security forces. Since 2023, ATMIS has withdrawn 5000 troops and handed over 13 Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) to the Somalia security forces[1]. Another drawdown of troops is anticipated by the end of June 2024, with 4000 troops set for withdrawal. This brief therefore evaluates Somalia’s security readiness in the post-ATMIS era and identifies key challenges that could hinder Somalia’s ability to manage its security following the withdrawal of ATMIS forces.
After the fall of Siad Barre’s government in 1991, Somalia has endured decades of conflict, instability, and the pervasive threat of terrorism. Despite significant strides made with the deployment of ATMIS and AMISOM, including the liberation of 80% of Somalia’s territory from AS, the withdrawal of ATMIS forces at the end of this year signals a notable shift in Somalia’s security dynamics[2]. Somalia lacks the capacity to manage its security independently for various reasons, as highlighted in a communiqué from the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) in March 2024, which endorsed a post-ATMIS security arrangement requested by Somalia[3]. This arrangement seeks an AU-led, United Nations-authorized peace support operation to replace ATMIS starting January 1, 2025.
Somalia’s ability to establish an effective nationwide security presence is hampered by limited financial and logistical resources. Historically, Somalia has relied heavily on external donors, with over two-thirds of its annual budget coming from donor sources, as confirmed by a January 2023 report by the Heritage Institute[4]. However, the adoption of the United Nations Resolution 2714 in 2023, which lifted the arms embargo on Somalia which has been in place since 1992, provides relief as international partners can now supply Somalia security forces with much-needed weapons to combat AS and improve operational capabilities. Furthermore, Somalia’s attainment of debt relief from the Paris Club group of countries after reaching the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) completion point opens avenues for more investment and additional financial resources.
Nevertheless, Somalia’s force generation has not kept pace with ATMIS troop reductions, leaving it vulnerable. The full withdrawal of 5000 troops during phases 1 and 2 has left ATMIS force strength at 13,586 troops, creating a potential security vacuum that Somali security forces, currently lacking adequate personnel, must fill[5]. Additionally, recruiting and training new personnel will take time, risking the creation of security gaps. Somalia’s security forces must maintain areas previously under ATMIS control while expanding into AS-held territories, a challenging task given manpower shortages. Failure to do so could reverse hard-won gains and have detrimental effects on Somalia and the Horn of Africa (HoA) region enabling the AS to regroup and launch attacks.
Divisions and power struggles between the federal government of Somalia and federal member states in implementing Somalia’s national security architecture hinder a unified structure capable of independently handling security post-ATMIS. The architecture, drafted in 2017 and revised in 2023, aims to confront security challenges through collaboration between the federal government and federal member states, establishing clear command structures, personnel numbers, and financing roles. However, divisions over power and command centrality impede its smooth implementation. Additionally, the different training doctrines employed by various geopolitical and regional actors in Somalia can pose a challenge to the cohesiveness and effectiveness of the Somalia security forces. Somalia has been a focal point for international intervention due to its longstanding instability, and as a result, multiple countries and organizations have engaged in training programs for Somali security forces. Key actors involved in these programs include Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA), and Ethiopia, among others. These actors often bring their own military doctrines, standards, and techniques, which may not always align with each other or with the specific needs and context of Somalia, exacerbating the fragmentation and inefficiency within the security sector.
In conclusion, this brief underscores challenges hindering Somalia’s security preparedness in the post-ATMIS era, including inadequate resources, difficulties in implementing the national security architecture, and insufficient force generation. To remedy the situation, Somalia should engage international partners such as the EU, UK, USA, and Turkey to secure sustainable funding for its security forces. For example, the recent approval of €116 million by the EU in April 2024 for stabilization efforts in Somalia is a positive step. This will enable equipping Somalia forces with requisite weapons, training, and logistical support. Additionally, the UN should authorize Somalia’s request for a post-ATMIS security arrangement. Considering the persistent issue of donor fatigue, Somalia should also access financial resources available through the African Union Peace Fund, enshrined within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Additionally, Somalia should leverage on its recent membership in the East African Community (EAC) by utilizing the region’s comprehensive counterterrorism strategies, financial resources, and mutual defense pacts to enhance its own stability and security. Moreover, Somalia should expedite comprehensive security sector reforms and DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) programs that actively engage local communities for their effective implementation. In addition, Somalia in collaboration with the AU should lobby the troop-contributing countries such as Kenya and Burundi to be part of the proposed post-ATMIS security arrangement. For instance, Ugandan authorities have already indicated that the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) will continue its presence in Somalia beyond the expiration of the ATMIS mandate[6]. To a significant extent, this will bolster the continuity of the mission, leveraging the existing expertise and familiarity with the operational security landscape. Furthermore, Somalia’s federal government and federal member states must collaborate to implement the national security architecture effectively.
[1] https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/eu-uk-to-pump-funds-into-somalia-security-sector-4597152
[2] https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/au-report-delays-plan-for-somalia-s-post-atmis-force-4588892
[3] COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE 1205TH MEETING OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL HELD ON 26 MARCH 2024 AND 3 APRIL 2024 ON THE BRIEFING BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA ON ITS PROPOSAL FOR A POST-ATMIS SECURITY ARRANGEMENT IN SOMALIA, PURSUANT TO UNSC RESOLUTION 2710 (2023)
[4]https://8v90f1.p3cdn1.secureserver.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Security-Sector-Reform-Jan-31.pdf
[5] https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-situation-in-somalia-post-atmis/
[6] https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/somalia-stabilisation-force-uganda-troops-answer-call-up–4604996